' 1	THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
2	CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-5929 (FSH)
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	HENRY ROUWENDAL & KATHLEEN :
4	ROUWENDAL, husband and wife, : TRANSCRIPT : OF
5	Plaintiffs, : PROCEEDINGS
_	-v-
6	: . ,
7	ANTHEM BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD, :
,	Defendant. :
8	x
9	February 8, 2007
	Newark, New Jersey
10	
11	B E F O R E: HONORABLE FAITH S. HOCHBERG, U.S.D.J.
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	APPEARANCES:
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	Attorney for the Defendant
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21	Purusant to Section 753 Title 28 United States Code, the
	following transcript is certified to be an accurate record
22	taken stenographically in the above entitled proceedings.
23	
24	JOHN KEVIN STONE,
25	Official Court Reporter
	<u> </u>

THE COURT: Be seated, please.

Good afternoon, counsel.

May I have appearances.

MR. KATZ: Yes.

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Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Eric Katz from the law firm of Mazie, Slater, Katz and Freeman on behalf of the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Katz.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Hi. David Goldstein, from the law firm of Morrison Cohen for defendant.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Goldstein.

Let me tell you why I have asked you to come in.

I have a serious and genuine question about subject matter jurisdiction in this case since it has been removed here on the ground of an allegation by the defendant that there is preemption by virtue of ERISA and therefore it must be in federal court.

We looked at the law on -- that both of you cited, and let me ask you, Mr. Goldstein, here's my question. As I -- and correct me if I'm wrong, and this is very broad brushed strokes. If I were to keep jurisdiction of this case and consider it in the format and the manner in which we in federal court handle traditional ERISA cases, as I understand it, I could only consider the record that your client put together pursuant to the terms of the plan that

they issued to this plaintiff, which is a plan that has a form of coverage that says that if you go out-of-network, you get the same reimbursement that -- the reimbursement is capped by the amount that you would pay to an in-network provider of the same service, roughly like that. Correct?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: That's correct, Your Honor.,

THE COURT: And so the plaintiffs, let me give you a hypothetical to illustrate what my issue is.

If the plaintiffs had bought a plan, had been told and purchased a plan which said to them, if you need a doctor, you have the right to go to Canada and hire the specialist at McGill Hospital. I'm just making this up.

Okay? And that's their right and that's what they bought.

And then now they're here and they have this plan which is nothing like that.

If they were right, that that's what they were sold, is there any way that I could possibly give them that relief here in the federal court action which limits me to the terms of the plan and the record of the administrator for this plan?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor, I believe that the court can consider the state law claim here, but I think that the facts will show --

THE COURT: That's not what I asked.

I can give them the state law relief.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, they have a state law claim 1 for a misrepresentation --2 3 THE COURT: Correct. MR. GOLDSTEIN: -- about pre-plan activities. 5 THE COURT: Correct. MR. GOLDSTEIN: It's defendant's allegation, that 6 7 there were no misrepresentation, therefore --THE COURT: That's not what I'm --8 MR. GOLDSTEIN: -- therefore you're governed by 9 the plan. So the answer is yes. 10 THE COURT: I'm not asking you that. I'm not 11 12 looking at the merits of whether the plaintiffs prevail or 13 They may or may not prevail. This is not a merits 14 inquiry. 15 This inquiry is, if what they said were true, they can't raise it here in the traditional ERISA case which 16 17 limits the court's review to the administrative record of 18 the ERISA determination within the scope of the ERISA plan. 19 Correct? 20 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: And getting the Cadillac at McGill 22 Hospital in Toronto, not the Cadillac, getting a doctor at McGill Hospital in Toronto is not part of the ERISA plan. 23 MR. GOLDSTEIN: That's correct, Your Honor. 24

THE COURT: All right.

So there's no way, if, even if what they said were true, there's no way they could get that relief.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, then their relief is limited to what they're entitled to under the plan. So under your hypothetical, yes.

THE COURT: You're not following me. I don/t know if it's deliberate or not.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, it's definitely not deliberate,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Let's suppose that you went into a room and you saw -- you sold to Mr. Katz' clients an oral description of a plan, and you said Mr. and Mrs. plaintiff, here is your plan. If you get sick, you can go to McGill University in Canada for your treatment. And it will be fully covered. They think they bought that plan.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct.

THE COURT: All right.

That's what I'm asking you. You then deliver to them a plan that has a paragraph in it that says what your plan says. And then your ERISA fiduciary denies their claim, saying you can't go to McGill University in Canada because it's not part of your plan, and they bring an action for fraud. You sold me a bill of goods they say. That's my problem.

Do you understand?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, I understand your problem.

THE COURT: So I can't --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I still think that that relates to the plan though, as to what they were promised under the plan.

THE COURT: No, it's not under the plan. This is what were they promised before they got the plan.

If you go into a room and promise to sell somebody a Cadillac under the plan, and then you send them a plan and it's got a Ford, and the limit of coverage is the Ford, that's not an ERISA issue, that's a fraud issue, or a misrepresentation issue, or a consumer confidence issue, or a New Jersey regulatory issue, or whatever you want to call it. But we're not looking at within the plan, we're looking at what did they buy. That's what I'm looking at. And that's my concern about the ERISA preemption argument. I am concerned that this is a claim that in a very street parlance sense says, you didn't sell me what I bought from you. I bought a plan that says I can go to the best specialist in McGill. I just made that up by the way, obviously. I tried to pick a hypothetical as far away from the situation here --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Sure.

THE COURT: -- so no one would think I was looking

at the merits. Because I'm not. I'm just trying to test the theory.

There's no way they can get relief. If I -- let me take it to cars, maybe that will be easier.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, I understand where you're going, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So how could I -- let's suppose that that happened.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, I think that the facts are important here in one respect. Because we -- there was brokers involved here, so what we didn't sell them, anything we didn't tell them anything, I have no documents to say what kind of misrepresentation we can -- what we gave them. From our standpoint this is a purely benefits, denial of benefits claim so...

THE COURT: And I -- and from your briefing that's very clear to me. That's how you're viewing it.

I'm trying to get your head to the way I'm looking at it, so you understand. Because the briefing is like ships passing in the night.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So that's why you're here.

So what you're saying to me is if they're making this claim of misrepresentation, it belongs in state court, but with additional parties other than you, the brokers, who

allegedly said something different should be parties too. 1 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Under your hypothetical. 2 THE COURT: Under their claim. 3 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Under their claim, no, I don't 4 5 think -- I think it belongs in this court. Because it is 6 based on a health plan that was provided by Mr. Rouwendal's employer. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you this. Maybe I 8 can make it -- I can't get you out of where you are. Let me 9 10 ask you this. Let's suppose that there was a broker at a health 11 12 fair run by his employer, and that broker is a broker for Anthem Blue Cross. And that broker says to them, if you 13 subscribe to our Anthem Blue Cross policy, we will give you 14 15 a Cadillac as a bonus. Okay? Anthem will. 16 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yes. THE COURT: And they say, fine. And then of course 17 Anthem sends them a policy and no Cadillac. 18 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Sure. 19 20 THE COURT: State court or federal court? MR. GOLDSTEIN: I believe it all should be here. 21 It's all ERISA based claim, whether they are alleging common 22 fraud law claims, it still belongs here, because it's 23 24 trumped by the plan. THE COURT: The plan doesn't say anything about a

Cadillac.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: But the allegations that plaintiff's raising, and the allegation in their complaint, are key to the language of the plan. It's plan based here.

THE COURT: What -- and I'm going to get to him in a minute.

This is what I read him -- read the plaintiffs' complaint, in sum and substance, as saying, and I obviously, as you will see, do not have -- I have all the pleadings in front of me, but I'm not reading from them.

What I construe the plaintiff's claim to be sounding in is as follows: The plaintiff's claim is that the plaintiff was represented that the Anthem plan that it was buying was a plan that included a provision that provided for out-of-network reimbursement based on UCR, but in fact what was delivered to them was a plan where out-of-network coverage was keyed -- was capped at what an in-network provider gets. In other words, a completely different standard in the plan for reimbursement, totally different plan language, not the contract they were told they were going to get. Is that how you read the plaintiffs' claim?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I am unsure how I read the plaintiffs' claim.

THE COURT: All right.

Why don't you sit down and we're going to ask the 1 2 plaintiffs lawyer to stand up. Okay. Mr. Katz, you now know the hypothetical. 3 MR. KATZ: Okay. You want me to answer the 4 5 McGill --6 THE COURT: Well, you can answer them both. 7 MR. KATZ: Okay. THE COURT: If you don't understand them either, 8 I'll change the hypothetical. 9 MR. KATZ: No, I think I understand it. 10 11 With respect to the McGill University issue, that's not something that this court could consider, because I 12 believe Your Honor is limited to the welfare fund's file and 13 this would be -- that's what you would be reviewing, and 14 that would be outside of that. You wouldn't be able to 15 16 consider that issue, that's beyond the court's ERISA review, 17 if ERISA applied to that situation, which I don't think it 18 does. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Now let's go to the second one. The Cadillac one. 20 How do you view that one, and then we'll go to the reality 21 of this case in a minute. 22 23 MR. KATZ: Same issue. 24 I mean if the inducement was before I purchase this 25 coverage, you're promising me something, I rely on that

promise, that's a pre-plan activity, and in this case if I'm expecting that Cadillac, and I don't get it, that's clearly outside of ERISA, that has nothing to do with ERISA.

THE COURT: All right.

Now, let's go -- that's how I've analyzed it as well. I've obviously picked an extreme hypothetical, now let's drag this discussion in to some zone of reality around this case. What in fact is it your complaint alleging?

MR. KATZ: I believe Your Honor aptly summarized what the claim is. Mr. Rouwendal and his wife were deciding which health insurance coverage they should pick. It was important in their considerations that they they be able to obtain out-of-network coverage. They had some options. They went with the Anthem policy based upon the representations made.

THE COURT: By whom.

MR. KATZ: By Anthem. As far as he knows it was Anthem people, as set forth in the document that Your Honor referred to in the standing order, that the out-of-network coverage would be determined based on UCR. And there are certain criteria set forth in there about what other providers in the geographic area submit, we look at expertise and the skill necessary.

THE COURT: What document now, just so I understand, what document of the many that I have you're

referring to?

MR. KATZ: We're referring to the written representations that were made in the Anthem -- in the coverage book that he received before --

MR. KATZ: It was attached in Mr. Goldstein's

THE COURT: Has that been given to the court?

THE COURT: All right.

essentially it says the exact same thing.

So he -- and what exhibit number is that, just so I can pull it out here?

MR. KATZ: It's attached as Exhibit A to Mr. Goldstein's moving memorandum.

THE COURT: Okay. Make sure I have it.

All right. So you're saying that the representations on which you relied are in Exhibit A to the defendant's submissions, the attachments to the memorandum, the law in support of removal.

MR. KATZ: That's correct.

Except, Your Honor, as I pointed out, the book that we have is -- the date of that book is August 2002. I believe this book is effective February 2003. So the pages are off a little bit. But the language is exactly the same.

THE COURT: Is there a section that has a name that's the same in bold type?

1	MR. KATZ: Well, in Mr. Goldstein's book it's M-17,
2	page M-17.
3	THE COURT: And in your book it's what?
4	MR. KATZ: In mine it's M-18. But the language is
5	identical.
6	THE COURT: M-17 is a pharmacy book, using a fmaily
7	benefit.
8	MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, Your Honor, there's
9	additional
10	THE COURT: Are there two M-17s?
11	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct.
12	It's further along in the certificate that I think
13	plaintiffs counsel was referring to.
14	THE COURT: All right.
15	You better make clear which M-17 you're referring
16	to.
17	MR. KATZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor. It's in the
18	certificate it's in the certificate.
19	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct, it's in the certificate.
20	MR. KATZ: It's in the document entitled "Your
21	Health Certificate."
22	THE COURT: "Your Health Certificate."
23	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor, on the bottom of the
24	page it says, "Health Certificate."
25	THE COURT: I see it. I have.

All right. It's M-17 of the health certificate 1 2 portion of the attachment. 3 MR. KATZ: Yes, ma'am. 4 THE COURT: All right. And you're saying that this is what he got or this 5 is what he negotiated for? 6 7 MR. KATZ: This is what he was provided before he made his determination to subscribe to this coverage. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. 10 And what particular line of this are you saying 11 that your complaint is premised upon? 12 MR. KATZ: Well, it's premised on two paragraphs, Your Honor. The first paragraph is in the second column of 13 14 M-17 which talks about for a non-network provider --15 THE COURT: Yes. 16 MR. KATZ: -- who is a physician or other 17 non-facility provider. 18 Then it goes on to say the maximum allowable amount is the lesser of the actual charge or the standard rate 19 20 under the particiaption agreement used with the network 21 providers for this product. 22 THE COURT: All right. 23 MR. KATZ: Okay. He looks at maximum allowable amount, which is in the first column of this page, it's in 24 25 bold.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KATZ: And their maximum allowable amount is, according to Anthem, determined by considering various factors, including, significantly, the amounts charged by other providers for that, the same or similar service, and unusual medical circumstances requiring additional time, skill or experience.

Mr. Rouwendal will testify at trial, assuming we were back in state court, that he -- his understanding of that was that he would be covered by the typical charge that out-of-network providers in the same geographic area with the same skill would have provided. And he would say that his -- he relied upon that to his detriment. That's why he signed up and subscribed and paid premiums for this coverage and then when it came time, and all that is pre-plan -- and then when it came time, when he needed the coverage, in reality what he got paid was a network rate of a thousand bucks on a \$32,000 surgery.

THE COURT: So did he ask any -- would he testify that he asked any questions or that's just how he read this handbook?

MR. KATZ: No, he would testify, Your Honor, that he asked -- he asked questions when he got it, because he was comparing the coverage with other plans, that he could have gone on his wife's COBRA, and there was something else

that he looked at, and he asked questions. And he was made to understand, and I know he's not here under oath now, I'm making these representations --

THE COURT: I'm just trying to figure out what the gist of the claim is.

MR. KATZ: Right.

THE COURT: Is it that he misread the handbook, or asked for clarification and was told something that didn't turn out to be true?

MR. KATZ: He asked for clarification of what it means, and he was led to believe that if you go out-of-network, you'd be paid usual and customary, or the coverage would be equivalent to a usual and customary, UCR rate.

THE COURT: And who -- did somebody actually say UCR, usual and customary?

MR. KATZ: UCR is what I'm using.

What I think he would say, Your Honor, based on my conversations with him, is that he was told that he would be paid what doctors of similar experience and background who provide the same service ordinarily get paid for rendering these services. And that he understood to mean what I call usual and customary, UCR.

I don't know at this point, we obviously haven't taken any discovery, if somebody actually said UCR to him,

or usual and customary rates. So that's discovery we haven't taken yet.

THE COURT: Fine. All right.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor, may I address some of the facts --

THE COURT: Yes, of course.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Thank you.

Just by way of background and, obviously, the same of this plaintiff, as what you -- this is what I was told by my client.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: The way this process worked, plaintiff worked for a company called Sylon, who is a Ohio based company who has offices, as I understand, from throughout the country. Sylon was unhappy with their previous health care provided, they used, and gave to their employee, so they scrapped Aetna and decided to go with Anthem. Okay?

In November 2002 Sylon submits an application to Anthem to be enrolled. In December, I mean, I'm sorry.

In January of '03, Anthem approves Sylon's application and approves the individual like Mr. Rouwendal who applied for coverage under the -- under the plan.

From what I understand, Sylon offered no other options other than Anthem. It's not like they had -- you

1	could choose Anthem or Oxford or some other health plan.
2	THE COURT: He said
3	MR. GOLDSTEIN: He made a choice.
4	THE COURT: Between Sylon or somebody else?
5	MR. GOLDSTEIN: He's saying through his wife's
6	plan, that's right. I have no reason to believe that's not
7	accurate.
8	THE COURT: Right.
9	MR. GOLDSTEIN: But I'm saying with respect to what
10	was offered, from what we know from our, my client's
11	standpoint
12	THE COURT: Right.
13	MR. GOLDSTEIN: this was the only option for
14	employees of Sylon.
15	THE COURT: Right.
16	MR. GOLDSTEIN: So the certificate, on January 9th,
17	Anthem approves Sylon's application, and then the documents,
18	including this certificate, goes out to people who were
19	approved for coverage, including plaintiff.
20	So the timing, from what I understand, the timing
21	is off. I don't think plaintiff received this prior to him
22	being already enrolled in the plan.
23	Nevertheless
24	THE COURT: Well, that would be
25	MR. GOLDSTEIN: that's a fact we're going to

have determine at some point.

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THE COURT: Exactly. Which ever tribunal which hears this case will decide whether he's telling the truth or not.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Sure.

But getting to the merits of what this document says, I think the court should not just look at M-17 in a vacuum. There's a couple of provisions throughout this certificate that clearly delineate that what he's entitled to if he chooses a non-network provider is the lesser of the actual charge or the standard rate for a network provider.

The part where it's in bold, Maximum Allowable

Amount, in M-17, if you look at the fourth bullet point, it

specifically says that that's one of the factors that is

considered in determining payments for non-network payments.

It's the amount accepted by a network provider as payment in

full under the partition agreement for this product.

THE COURT: It's one of the four.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: It's one of the four. So he knew that that was a factor.

THE COURT: Are you saying that the record will show that your response to his fraud claim will be that you're going to show, in whatever court we deem this goes to, that Anthem in fact looked at amounts charged by other providers for the same or similar service?

1	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct.
2	THE COURT: They did?
3	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct.
4	We have a payment schedule where the amount that
5	was paid is in line with what's paid throughout the country,
6	including what's paid by Medicare.
7	THE COURT: And that you looked at any unusual
8	medical circumstances requiring any additional time, skill
9	or experience?
10	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, that that is part of the
11	process, from my understanding, is plaintiffs fault why we
12	did not do that, they never appealed the decision of the
13	denial of coverage, which is required under the plan. And
14	if they did so, that's when those extraordinary
15	circumstances would come up and would be reviewed. The
16	way
17	THE COURT: But that does it say that here?
18	MR. GOLDSTEIN: The appeal process, Your Honor, is
19	on page M
20	THE COURT: No, I'm not asking that, this doesn't
21	say you have to appeal for us to consider any unusual
22	medical circumstances.
23	MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, but it's in the booklet, it
24	explains the procedure.

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THE COURT: It says, we will not look at any

unusual medical circumstances unless you appeal? 1 2 MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, it does not, Your Honor. 3 just telling you how procedurally it works. THE COURT: So Anthem does not look at any unusual 4 medical, requiring any additional time, skill or experience 5 6 unless there's an appeal? 7 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, the way that the system works, it's a little more complicated. The way the system 8 9 works is, from what I understand, the claim's filed 10 electronically, when it hits the system, it's billed according to the code rates, and it's paid, the payments are 11 12 made according to the code rates. Whatever the rates are in 13 the system, less the deductible, less the co-pay, and that's 14 what was paid out. 15 THE COURT: But the rate in the system is solely 16 the in-network provider rate. 17 MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, no, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: What's the rate in the system? 19 MR. GOLDSTEIN: The rate in the system is the 20 lesser of the actual charge that was charged by the doctor or what's in the system for the provider. 21 THE COURT: Wait a minute. That's not answering my 22 23 question. 24 What's the rate that's in the system? 25 MR. GOLDSTEIN: The rate in the system varies,

1 depending upon where the coverage is and throughout the In different -- in different states it's in 2 country. 3 different amounts, all within the \$2,000 range that was paid. 4 5 THE COURT: But the rate in the system, does it differ from the network provider rate? 6 7 MR. GOLDSTEIN: The rate in the system is the 8 network provider rate. 9 THE COURT: That's what I asked you about four 10 questions ago. 11 MR. GOLDSTEIN: I apologize, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. That's okay. That's what I thought. 13 14 So basically, when a claim goes in, a computer 15 automatically sends out a check for the in-network provider 16 rate, regardless of the bill, unless the bill from the 17 out-of-network provider happens to be less than the in-network rate? 18 19 That is my understanding. Unless MR. GOLDSTEIN: 20 there is also additional data provided as to why it may meet 21 extenuating circumstances. I don't know how, what was 22 submitted in this case, so I don't know if that information was provided. 23

up being more than the actual rate charged by an

24

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THE COURT: How often does the in-network rate end

out-of-network provider?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: It would be very rare, Your Honor. It's incentive for a doctor to be in plan.

THE COURT: I'm not questioning -- I'm just saying.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Absolutely.

THE COURT: They basically -- right. So it, almost never is the bill, it's the in-network rate.

So what he's saying is his claim is that someone told him, and I'm not evaluating the merits of the claim, his claim, as I understand it from Mr. Katz, is someone told him that when he submitted a claim, the four bullets in the column marked "Maximum Allowable Amount," would be used to determine his claim. And that it wouldn't be limited by the last sentence of the second paragraph in the next column on page M-17 of the health certificate, which limits it to network providers unless he appeals.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: That appears to be what he's saying. However, you know, if you're alleging misrepresentations, we need a little bit more to go on that.

THE COURT: I'm not saying -- I'm not alleging anything. I'm just trying to figure out whether the claim sounds in pre-plan misrepresentation or post plan arbitrary and capricious behavior. That's what -- and I'm not saying anything about the merits of the claim.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: From --

THE COURT: Just trying to figure out what the claim is.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: But from my --

THE COURT: All right?

And from my -- I mean it -- whatever court you're in, presumably, there's going to be a battle about who said what to whom when. You're going to say you couldn't possibly have asked the question because you didn't have the booklet until you picked our plan. But I'm not hear to hear all that. That may be true, that may not be true. I don't know, and that's not outcome determinative of what the claim is. The question is, what is the claim.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Sure.

But, Your Honor, he, plaintiffs counsel is saying that plaintiff looked at this language and then questioned this language. So it's clearly related to the plan, the case is related to the plan, and the development court, and the Supreme Court said, where it relates to the plan at issue, it's trumped by ERISA.

THE COURT: But -- so the only, let's suppose that he is sitting in a room trying to decide which plan to buy. All right? Even though you say there was only one available as an employee. He's comparing his -- what's the name of the company --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Sylon.

THE COURT: What does Sylon do, just so maybe I can 1 remember the name better? 2 3 MR. GOLDSTEIN: I --MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I don't know. 4 THE COURT: You don't know either. 5 Well, sounds like a halfway between nylon and 6 Xenon. 7 All right. So, he's sitting in the company 8 cafeteria, or wherever, in his home, in his living room, and 9 10 he's looking at his wife's COBRA plan, and he's looking at 11 the Sylon plan, and he's saying, where should I spend my 12 dollars to pay for coverage. And someone says to him, look, 13 here it says, someone from Anthem or Sylon -- how come you 14 only have Anthem in here, Mr. Katz? Why don't you actually 15 have whoever made the misrepresentation? 16 MR. KATZ: My understanding is it is Anthem, so that's why we have not added any parties or ERISA --17 THE COURT: He's going to say, he's going to 18 testify that he actually spoke to some representative of 19 20 Anthem? 21 MR. KATZ: It's my understanding, now if that person ends up being a broker, it's sometimes, you know, a 22 23 lay person meets with people like --24 THE COURT: But it's somebody purporting to be 25 stating what the Anthem coverage is?

MR. KATZ: Well, that's right. That's right. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. So --MR. KATZ: It could have been could be an agent of 3 the plan, we haven't gotten that far. 4 5 THE COURT: Exactly. I understand that. 6 Okay. He's saying he spoke to someone purportedly 7 representing the interests of Anthem or giving him information as if it were from Anthem. These are all 8 9 questions to be decided later, if we ever get there. 10 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Sure. 11 THE COURT: And that person says to him, oh, look 12 at M-17. If you go out-of-network you will get an amount 13 charged by other providers for that, the same or similar 14 service, or -- and if there's any unusual medical 15 circumstance, we'll consider that, we'll also consider a resource base relative value scale. What is that? What's 16 17 bullet three? 18 MR. GOLDSTEIN: I have to check with that my client, Your Honor. I'm not sure. 19 20 I'm now not sure how that is part -- what that language means, what that term means, resource based 21 relative values. 22 THE COURT: What do you think it means? You're a 23 24 relatively educated lay person. MR. GOLDSTEIN: The value -- the value of the 25

procedure, I assume. But it varies. I don't know. I mean
I don't want to represent what it means, Your Honor, because
I really don't know.

THE COURT: That's part of the problem here. This literature requires you to ask questions because it's inexplicable. I'm a modestly educated lay person, and I'm not sure I know what the phrase "other factors we determine are relevant, including, but not limited to, a resource based relative value scale."

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I think the issue though of what it means is -- goes back to the issue that that's related to the plan.

THE COURT: All right.

What I'm trying to say --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: And I don't --

THE COURT: -- to you, Mr. Goldstein, yes, it is.

If you, unequivocally say, he bought this plan, I didn't

look at a thing I said, whatever, it is, it's mine. But

what he's saying is he actually looked at all these bullet

points, had a conversation with someone, was misrepresented

and never bought a plan other than the one he thought he was

buying. That's because there's language in here that it's

perfectly logical you might ask a question. And I'm saying

it's right, I was wrong, or what the answer was or wouldn't

be to that question. I'm just saying that's what his claim

1	is. His claim is I got the book, I compared the plans
2	side-by-side, this one and the other one, and I bought this
3	one because someone told me what this language meant in this
4	one. Is basically what he's saying. And the question is
5	what does the law do under those circumstances.
6	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Your Honor, I believe it's,
7	preempted by ERISA, as the long line of plaintiffs who have
8	tried to make these sorts of arguments before in cases
9	THE COURT: Give me the best case for that.
10	MR. GOLDSTEIN: In the Lamonica case that this
11	court decided
12	THE COURT: Lamonica?
13	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yes.
14	THE COURT: Do we have a copy of Lamonica for me?
15	MR. GOLDSTEIN: I'll get one, Your Honor.
16	May I approach?
17	THE COURT: Yes, yes.
18	Just give it to my law clerk. She'll give it to
19	me.
20	MR. GOLDSTEIN: I apologize, it's marked up but
21	THE COURT: Or my courtroom deputy.
22	That's okay.
23	MR. GOLDSTEIN: In the Lamonica case, if I may,
24	Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: The plaintiff filed a complaint in a New York, in New Jersey Superior Court, alleging state tort law claims for bad faith, to seek negligent -- intentional afflication of emotional distress. The court reasoned that the bad faith claims were based upon the allegedly and improper processing of their -- the claim for benefit. And that was accepted.

THE COURT: That's different, that's -- right.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: The court also dismissed their deceit and fraud cause of actions on the grounds that the state law claims for fraud and deceit are preempted by ERISA.

THE COURT: And what were the fraud and deceit premised on, factually?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I believe, Your Honor, obviously, you have the decision, I believe it was with respect to representations made about the necessity of cosmetic breast reduction surgery.

THE COURT: Hang on, let me -- I've got your copy, let me look. It's not fair to ask you questions when you don't have the case. Let me take a quick look at it and then I'll hand it back to you.

So this was, plaintiff was claiming that she needed breast reduction surgery because she had neck and back problems caused by the the excessive weight of her breasts.

The defendants argued that the surgery was cosmetic and 1 therefore excluded from coverage. 2 Where are the fraud and deceit claims in here? 3 MR. GOLDSTEIN: I believe they're at page 19, Your 4 Honor. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 THE COURT: At 19 in this case the -- it recites 7 that the tort of deceit was allegedly allowing an 8 unqualified person to serve as the independent consultant 9 who reviewed the claims for coverage. Because that person 10 was not a licensed physician. 11 12 The court finds again these claims are directly related to the alleged improper processing of Lamonica's 13 benefits and are therefore preempted. And then it cites 14 several other cases that have specifically held that state 15 law claims for fraud and deceit are preempted by ERISA, 16 citing Davidian, Reilly -- Davidian and Reilly. 17 What that doesn't address is the crux of what I've 18 been -- you may have this case back. I've not read -- have 19 I read Davidian and Reilly, was that in the package? 20 THE CLERK: I don't think so. 21 THE COURT: Okay. That was talking about the 2.2 processing of the claim. 23

As I understand it, the plaintiff is not making a claim here because of the processing of the claim.

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MR. KATZ: That's correct, Your Honor.

All those cases speak about post plan activity.

This is -- the misrepresentation we allege here is what induced him to purchase the coverage in the first place.

Using the case that Your Honor just reviewed, if the allegation -- if I may give one hypothetical, if the allegation there was, you told me before I purchased this plan that you would cover breast reduction surgery, and you didn't do it, and it turns out they didn't do it, that would be -- that claim would not have been preempted.

But here she purchased the coverage, she later goes for a breast reduction surgery, the carrier determines it's not medically necessary. That is clearly involved with the plan. That, you know, that's flat smack in the middle of the plan's function as a fiduciary.

THE COURT: I certainly agree with you about that case.

I don't know what the Reilly and -- I'm going to ask my law clerk to go pull them, so we take a look at the cases cited. There's a blanket sentence after that that says, courts routinely decide that cases of fraud and deceit are preempted. I'm going to go read the cases cited and the case cited by the defendant.

MR. KATZ: That's fine.

THE COURT: Unless anyone of you has them here.

MR. KATZ: Actually I don't, Your Honor, and I can't say I remember every single fact pattern in the case.

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Well, in the Lamonica -- I may not be pronouncing

-- the decision he handed me, it's not old, it's not new, so

it's citing to 1988 cases, the chances are you haven't

looked at it, that's why we're going to get them, and the

cases may have had a great amount of law since then, but I

thought we ought to at least read them. It's a blanket

statement. It's a District Court case, it doesn't bind me,

I'm trying to come out with the right answer here.

MR. KATZ: As I understand.

As Your Honor knows, I cited cases that deal with this issue of pre-plan misrepresentation.

THE COURT: So I understand it, it is not the plaintiff's desire ever to try to get leave to appeal and resubmit for unusual medical circumstances?

MR. KATZ: We shouldn't -- first of all, this is the first I ever heard, I never heard of a situation like this, where they say up front we're going to consider certain criteria and then they won't consider it until you appeal, but --

THE COURT: Neither have I? That's a new one for me, and I thought I heard it all.

MR. KATZ: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

1	But putting that aside, no, Your Honor. I mean I
2	would even venture to say they probably processed the claim
3	correctly because they're going to pay the network rate
4	every single time. And if it turns out they actually pay a
5	thousand dollars for doing metastatic brain surgery, so be
6	it.
7	THE COURT: He said it was 2,000, your client
8	said
9	MR. KATZ: It was 1,000.
10	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, that's after the deductible
11	and co-pays.
12	THE COURT: All right.
13	After the deductible and co-pays.
14	What is the full, the in-network rate for
15	metastatic brain
16	MR. KATZ: \$2,450.93.
17	THE COURT: All right. Who does it
18	MR. GOLDSTEIN: A couple of hundred dollars cheaper
19	than what Medicare provides, and other providers throughout
20	the country pay for that surgery.
21	MR. KATZ: Well, that first of all, we're
22	talking about a commercial plan, not Medicare, number one.
23	And number two, I would seriously dispute that the usual
24	customary

THE COURT: What's the UCR for this procedure?

MR. KATZ: We --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: What they're claiming it is --

MR. KATZ: What was submitted by these neurosurgeons who relied --

THE COURT: No, UCR, is there a UCR that you've looked at, any database?

MR. KATZ: If I may, Your Honor, these neurosurgeons rely on Ingenix, as Your Honor may know, Ingenix --

THE COURT: Oh, I know a lot about Ingenix.

MR. KATZ: I figured you would, Your Honor.

And Ingenix is considered by many of -- in the industry, one of the entities that gathers this kind of information to determine usual and customary rates.

This practice relied on what's called their customized Ingenix fee analyzer, which is based upon a neurosurgeon within the zip code of Hackensack, New Jersey, rendering these specific CPT codes, and that's how they bill. So that -- what's been represented to me by the practice is in fact UCR. That might be an expert issue ultimately, who knows.

THE COURT: Well -- that may actually show you

Ingenix, yes, because I don't know, I haven't had the

benefit of getting to a hearing on precisely how the Ingenix

database goes.

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I have fair amount of experience in this area, I do a lot of managed care litigation. Ingenix guards this thing like Fort Knox.

THE COURT: Well, it's certainly clear to me from my efforts to find out about it for the last five years, it certainly is guarded like Fort Knox.

MR. KATZ: I understand.

THE COURT: I've never been battling at the doors of Fort Knox so long just to find out information which might be perfect, just wonderful, but I'd like to know just what it is.

MR. KATZ: I'm fully familiar. I know what -- the cases Your Honor is referring to.

But the physicians I've represented in other matters that have showed me their Ingenix fee analyzers, it's a book, it says, CPT code, you know, 91213, 50th percentile; 70th percentile this amount, that amount, you know, it's a chart, how they --

THE COURT: The question is, what is the source of the data that's entered into that chart, and does it include non-physician services? I have a lot of questions about the data, because I just want to know, having had a case involving it for so long, and I'm not asking, it doesn't affect you right now --

MR. KATZ: Right.

-- because your claim is not whether THE COURT: 1 the Ingenix database correctly or incorrectly comes up with 2 a UCR figure, or is a premise for a UCR figure. Your claim 3 is that your client was told by someone purportedly on 4 behalf of Anthem. And obviously, this raises questions of 5 agency that are not being ruled on. But that someone told 6 7 your client that his claims would be reviewed using a UCR type database. And he was sold a plan that did not. 8 MR. KATZ: That's --9 10 THE COURT: And the defendants would counter that 11 while there are four bullet points in the brochure, the 12 second paragraph of the second column tells you that you get -- that the maximum allowable amount is the lesser of 13 14 the actual charge or the charge used by in-network 15 providers, which actually makes those bullets sort of 16 meaningless.

MR. KATZ: Exactly. I mean we're not here on a summary judgment --

THE COURT: Why --

MR. KATZ: -- but there's fundamentally --

THE COURT: -- Mr. Goldstein --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- you're in the wrong courtroom for this kind of case, I think you probably know that by now.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: I am sensing -- I am sensing.

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THE COURT: No, no, seriously, sir. I've been looking at gobbledygook for years now. And this -- and this kind of gobbledygook. And I'm not ruling, but I do -- it's sort of jumping off the page at me as I'm trying to orally work through it myself, that the bullets are meaningless once you get to the second paragraph of the second column.

MR. KATZ: That's right.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, it might make a difference if you look at the paragraph preceding that, where it talks about network providers as opposed to non-network providers. There's a distinction made.

MR. KATZ: No, but the point is, you'll never get the maximum allowable.

THE COURT: Then you never get the maximum allowable based on the definition of maximum allowable amount.

MR. KATZ: That's it.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, there could be instances -well, this particular case where he's claiming that UCR is
\$30,000 and the payment was 22, there could be situations
where the gap is much shorter, or that what's paid by what a
physician charged for who is in plan is less.

THE COURT: You just told me about ten minutes ago that never happens.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: It's unlikely that it could happen.

The difference here --

THE COURT: You're -- here's the problem. Even -even -- we're here, three lawyers, we've all, I don't know,
how many years have you been practicing law, Mr. Goldstein?
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Seven years.

THE COURT: You're a smart guy practicing law seven years; I'm a smart woman practicing law 31 years, and you, Mr. Katz?

MR. KATZ: 15.

THE COURT: 15. All right.

So I have some years on you, which means my education is more dated. So let's say we're all about equal, an ordinary lay person. Even you or I are struggling with what this means. So it's logical that someone's going to ask a question. You can't -- I mean if it were so inherently obvious from the written page, then you might have an argument that says, oh, that's so inherently preposterous, he clearly knew what he was getting, even -- I mean I don't care if he asked someone is the sky blue and the person said, the sky is orange. That's just ridiculous. Look, it's as clear as day in black and white on page M-17. The trouble is, it's as murky as mud on page M-17, which means that it's logical that someone asked a question.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, I don't think the facts play out as it being logical, the surgery that was performed,

that was being disputed here was two and a half years after the plain was effectuated for this plaintiff.

THE COURT: But he wasn't asking specifically about surgery, he was saying, as I understand Mr. Katz, hey, look, I want to be sure I always get the doc I think is best for my health.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Right.

THE COURT: Right?

I mean I'm trying to distill it down to its simplest, first grader type language. And I'm going to let Mr. Katz change, if what I said oversimplifies in any way his concern. He wasn't saying, oh, look in 2001, and I'm picking dates out of the air, he's not saying in 2001 I knew my wife was going to have brain cancer in 2003 so I picked this policy.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well, when he filled out his application she already new she had cancer, it was a pre-existing --

THE COURT: Well, then he may have.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: -- the -- my point is for two and a half years they never said they were defrauded or misrepresented any information.

THE COURT: Because they thought -- they thought they were going -- that they bought a policy that covered, they're saying they thought they bought a policy that gave

them a UCR based rate of reimbursement.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Okay.

But even if they're right, what they'e complaining about was the amount that was paid.

THE COURT: No, see, that's where I fundamentally disagree with you.

You are just -- I do not agree with you on that,

Mr. Goldstein. I agree with you that it's an issue that can
legitimately be claimed, and is all the time, I suppose, by
carriers. But he's not -- he's saying I'm not challenging
your processing, because your computer kicked out the right
check. He's saying no one told me that I wouldn't have
usual medical circumstances looked at until I appealed, if
I'd known that, I might have filed a timely appeal. But I
didn't.

But anyway, he's saying the true way the plan works was not told to him, that he was told the out of plan -this plan would give him a UCR basis for reimbursement, and
the truth is that unless you're as deeply familiar with
insurance litigation as I am becoming, to my great chagrin,
you would not know a lot of the buzz words that you take for
granted because you represent carriers, and that I take for
granted because I've had so much this litigation, and Mr.
Katz takes for granted because he's had a lot of this
litigation, which is this whole concept of in-network

providers and caps and this and that, so that that this second paragraph isn't so inherently obvious. In fact, it's anything but inherently obvious. Especially when preceded by the four bullets, that you can't say that the claim that someone told him what was covered is so preposterous that it couldn't possibly be. That it has to be a claim about the amount rather than the type of plan he got. He's saying I got a Ford plan, I thought I was buying a Cadillac plan.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Right.

And in his complaint and in his affirmation he's not saying who told him he got a Ford, there's no evidence whatsoever with respect to that.

THE COURT: All right.

Okay. Mr. Goldstein, you and I both know that goes to evidence. Which believe me, if it were here, we would start scrutinizing.

But the trouble is that claim can't be here. The only thing that can be here, if you stay here under ERISA, is what does this plan provide. And if you come back to me, if I send you off and you come back to me, then I ask questions like, what does this plan really provide. How does one figure out whether the computer that just spits out a check automatically giving you the in-network provider fee is in fact arbitrary and capricious, if in fact the booklet says we're going to look at these four bullets.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: If the plaintiff believed that he was sold the wrong car --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: -- when he got the explanation of benefits and the check for a thousand dollars, with the details about how to appeal that process because you may feel something, if you feel it's calculated in error, he could have appealed it then.

THE COURT: He didn't think it was calculated in error. He thinks it was the wrong plan. He's saying, -
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Well --

THE COURT: -- and if he appealed it and they said, no, no, no, let's talk about that. Let's suppose he wrote in a letter that said, to Anthem, I appeal your decision to reimburse me at the rate of \$2,000 less deductible, because it is not a UCR based rate. That is the basis of my appeal.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Correct.

THE COURT: Anthem would have said, too bad, so sad, that is not your plan. Correct?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Anthem would have looked at the documents he provided showing what usual and customary rates are, what -- why this was a circumstance that warranted a deviation from this. We had no opportunity to do that.

THE COURT: You're saying he had to appeal to get

you to look at the bullets. Are you willing to look --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: We're -- no --

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THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Maybe I can settle this case. Are you willing now --

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Of course, to look at the appeal, yes.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. You haven't heard the rest of the question.

Are you willing now, I mean we can have a wonderful esoteric discussion about the metes and bounds of preemption, which I'm happy to do, as well as the insurance language, which if you want to do something useful, you should go back to your client and suggest that you sit down and rewrite things with them. Not just your client, all these clients.

MR. GOLDSTEIN: Sure.

THE COURT: Because these books are not clear at all to highly educated readers, much less uneducated readers, not in the remotest. I'm not even sure the claims processors have a clue what these nice books mean. The computer is programmed to spit out a check, it spits out a check, and then basically that's -- what Rouwendal probably didn't know, that's just the beginning, that's an invitation to negotiate. Right?

Right. But he didn't know that because it doesn't

say that in the book either. You have to start calling and yammering and explaining and then you get to your four bullets and whatever.

Be that as it may, are you now interested in taking a look at UCR and willing to calculate for the purposes of settlement only, a reimbursement rate based on a mutually agreeable database, as a point of discussion, putting aside the limitation about in-network providers? Because that may save both of you an awful lot of time and litigation costs.

Here's my concern. I can see me saying to you, I've thought long and hard about this, I really have, as you possibly can tell, perhaps, or not. I have. But I think that while there's no case directly on point here, it's closer to the pre-plan activity than it is to a claim about how the plan was processed or whether something that was covered under the plan should have been paid but wasn't paid, which is the standard junk -- the standard things we get. That this claim is conceptually different enough to say you're going back to state court. And then one or the other, you'll probably appeal, if you can. I don't even know if you can appeal a remand.

MR. KATZ: You can't, Your Honor, my understanding.

THE COURT: Because that is, if you could, you have two years in the circuit and it's very expensive for both of you. And I'm trying to avoid that, to see if there's a way

both of you gentlemen can sit down and see if you can work
out a way, or is it not just this surgery? Do you want out
of the plan, what you do really want?

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, this --

THE COURT: And do you want to go off the record now that we're talking about settlement?

MR. KATZ: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Because I think I know enough from both of to you decide this. I'm perfectly happy now to talk to you about settling this thing, if you want to settle before I make a decision about my jurisdiction.

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, with all due respect, this is a very significant issue in this area of the law, and I would -- I will take my chances and roll the dice on Your Honor making a decision on the jurisdictional issue. If Mr. Goldstein wants to talk settlement after this matter is remanded, if that's what Your Honor's decision is, I'll be happy to talk to him. But we've come to this point because of the significance of this issue.

THE COURT: I agree with you. It's significant. I also don't want you to think that I'm going to write a 20 page opinion on the topic.

MR. KATZ: I appreciate that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I scrutinize all the papers, I look very deeply at them. I may just rule from the bench.

MR. KATZ: Your Honor, I appreciate that, and I 1 understand that an opinion that Your Honor may issue from the bench or even a written opinion is, you know, it's 3 juris -- its precedential value is limited, or extremely 4 limited. But it would nevertheless be a significant issue 5 where a District of New Jersey Judge has made a ruling on a matter that comes up quite often. And I would respectfully 7 ask that Your Honor make the ruling. I have no idea what it 8 But I think it's an important ruling to make. I mean we've come this far, Your Honor. I'll take my chances, my 10 client will take the chances. 11

THE COURT: Okay. And I certainly would never force you to talk settlement, that's not my goal. I was just seeing if I could save both sides some serious difficulty here.

MR. KATZ: I mean --

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THE COURT: And I'm not -- I think I've been very loud and clear, and you're both highly intelligent attorneys and understand, I'm not ruling at all or even inclined to rule at all on anything related to the merits of this claim.

All I am considering is what is -- what does the claim sound in, and is it properly the subject of ERISA preemption.

MR. KATZ: I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Is there anything else either one of you wants to

to say before we take this under advisement?

MR. KATZ: Not from the plaintiffs, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Goldstein?

MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take a brief recess.

( After a brief recess court resumed ).

THE COURT: You may be seated, counsel.

I have gone back and read the two cases cited in the opinion handed to me by the defendants in this case.

Both relate clearly to the way a plan was administered. So they are not particularly apposite.

I find that this case is more apposite to the Woodworkers Supply versus Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company case, and to the series of cases cited on page 9, -- excuse me, I'm using page 9 of the copy I have, it's page 991, it would be 170 F. 3d. at 991 of that case, because what is the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint here is that the plaintiff was not sold the plan that the plaintiff thought he was being sold to cover himself and his wife, and relied on a representation as to what that plan consisted of or was, in order to decline to enter into another plan. It's logical and non-frivolous, although I make no fact findings here, and indeed, plaintiff will have many hurdles to climb as an evidentiary matter. But it is not inherently

implausible that there were such oral representations prior to the decision being made to subscribe to the Anthem plan, the plaintiff's wife was already ill. That makes it logical that the plaintiff would be looking, particularly closely, at the type of coverage, the basis for coverage provided in a plan, and would ask close questions about it, knowing that his wife had a lethal brain tumor and would probably, or might require surgery in the future.

While I don't get to the merits, if the health certificate were so crystal clear that it could not possibly render believable a claim that someone was told something else about what this plan's basis for reimbursement was, I might look very close, even more closely at it. However, in this circumstance the provisions of the health certificate that have been drawn to my attention are anything but crystal clear. Indeed, counsel is unable to even understand certain of them, which renders it logical that someone would can ask before subscribing to ensure that an understanding of his terms of the bullet points on M-17 made sense.

I am not rendering an opinion about what is or is not covered by the plan. That would be preempted by ERISA.

What this plaintiff says is he was not given the plan he believed he subscribed to. He believed he was subscribing to a plan that provided for reimbursement on a UCR basis, and he was given a plan that provided for

reimbursement on an -- with a cap and an in-network provider 1 rate. Therefore, the claim for misrepresentation under state law can proceed, and it is not preempted by ERISA. 3 There is no way that an ERISA evaluation in this court would 4 even reach the claim that the plaintiff is making. This 5 court would be limited to the record of the plan and how it 6 determined reimbursement. That is not the question being 7 posed by the plaintiff in his lawsuit. The plaintiff is 8 saying, "I did not get the plan I bought." For that reason, 9 I am remanding this case. 10 11 Is there anything further, gentlemen? MR. KATZ: Nothing, Your Honor. 12 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Nothing, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 14 15 MR. KATZ: Thank you. THE CLERK: All rise. 16 ( Court adjourned ). 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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